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RETIREE WELFARE BENEFITS: ERISA, LMRA AND THE
FEDERAL COMMON LAW
Many employers offer some type of retiree health care coverage.'
Employers are concerned over substantial increases in health care costs, which
combined with the growing number of retirees, have placed an unanticipated
financial burden on employee health care plans.' In recent years, early retire-
ment incentive plans have increased the number of retirees who receive such
health benefits.' Additionally, the population is growing older as the average
life expectancy in the United States increases. The situation is exacerbated by
the concern over the federal budget deficit: any cut in Medicare increases
retiree medical costs.' Health care benefits are naturally of paramount impor-
tance for elderly retirees.' Accordingly, the private sector will have to bear in-
creasing responsibility for health care of the elderly.
As employers modify retiree health care plans to reduce costs6 or ter-
minate plans as they file bankruptcy7 or close plants," arguments between
employers and employees concerning health care plans have increasingly
become the subject of lawsuits9 and legal commentary. At issue is whether
employers have the right to unilaterally terminate or reduce retiree welfare
benefits or whether the rights have vested in the retirees.
Welfare benefits are defined under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974" (ERISA) as including medical, surgical, hospital,
sickness, disability, unemployment, and death benefits. 2 Welfare benefits,
unlike pension benefits, 3 are not subject to the strict vesting requirements of
'Of firms with more than 100 employees, almost sixty percent offer retiree health care coverage. Van Olson,
Nonpension Retiree Benefits: Are They for Life? Management Guidelines to the Issue, 36 LAB. L.J. 402
(1985).
'Id. See also Musto v. American Gen. Corp., 615 F.Supp. 1483, 1496 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (four-fold increase
in costs over last five years).
'Van Olson, supra note 1.
"See also Policy v. Powell Pressed Steel Co., 770 F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1985) (Company originally agreed to pay
fifty percent of the cost of retirees' health benefits supplemental to Medicare. Later agreements increased
this to 100 percent).
'Reducing Retirees' Health Benefits: The Courts Develop a Remedy, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1399 (1985).
6E.g., Musto, 615 F.Supp. at 1483.
'E.g., In re White Farm Equipment Co., 788 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1986).
'E.g., Weimer v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 773 F.2d 669 (6th Cir. 1985); Policy v. Powell Pressed Steel Co., 770
F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1985); Int'l Union (UAW) v. Roblin Indust., 561 F.Supp. 288 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
9Id.
"0Supra notes I and 5; infra note 25.
1129 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
1229 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1982 & Supp. 1986). This section defines welfare benefits as
medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability,
death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care
centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services.
"Pension benefits are defined under ERISA as retirement income or deferral of income by employees. 29
U.S.C. § 1002(2) (1986).
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ERISA. 4 This gap in federal statutory law has led the courts to formulate their
own analysis as to when employers may terminate or reduce the welfare
benefits of retirees.
Part I of this comment will examine the applicable statutory law in this
area. Part II will examine the developing body of federal case law. Part III will
address the underlying policy concerns in conjunction with already established
precedent to provide insight into what the law in this area should be.
I. APPLICABLE LAW
Federal Statutory Law
Employee benefit plans in general are the subject of ERISA. ERISA does
not require the creation of employee benefit plans," but once an employer or
employee organization establishes a benefit plan, the employer or employee
organization must comply with ERISA regulations."6
Both welfare and pension benefit plans are subject to reporting and
disclosure requirements. 7 ERISA also defines the fiduciary responsibilities of
the administrator and standard of care to be followed. 8 ERISA pension plans
are subject to stringent funding and vesting requirements based on age and
length of service. 9 ERISA, however, specifically exempts employee welfare
plans from the vesting0 and funding' provisions.
Plaintiffs attempting to enforce welfare benefits under ERISA's fiduciary
responsibility provision have met with little success. 2 The only requirement is
"29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061 (1986).
1529 U.S.C. § 1003 (1982).
129 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1982).
"Each participant in the plan must be provided with a summary plan description and summary of any mate-
rial modifications; these summaries must also be filed with the Secretary of Labor. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-22
(1982). See generally A Practical Guide to the New Pension Reform Legislation (S. Glasser ed. 1975).
"A fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries and -
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a pru-
dent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an
enterprise of a like character and with like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses, unless under
the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as such documents
and instruments are consistent with the provisions of this title or Title IV.
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1982).
1929 U.S.C. §§ 1051-61 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
-29 U.S.C. § 1051(1) (1982).
2129 U.S.C. § 1081 (1982).
"Of course, if a fiduciary failed to administrate the plan according to plan documents, plaintiffs could sue
under ERISA's fiduciary provision. The difficulty is in ascertaining whether plan documents give retirees a
vested right to the welfare benefits.
[Vol. 20:3
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that welfare provisions not be arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable on their
face or as applied.23 Thus, health benefits cannot be reduced or eliminated in an
arbitrary or unreasonable manner, or for a capricious reason. However, plain-
tiffs have been denied relief under this standard because defendants may prove,
and usually do, that benefit reductions or terminations were the result of finan-
cial necessity.24 One commentator has noted that "because of the great defer-
ence courts give to the decisionmaker, it is difficult to prevail under this
theory."25
Federal Common Law
More important than ERISA's fiduciary provision, at least on the issue of
vesting of welfare benefits, is ERISA's preemption provision.26 As a result of
this provision, federal courts are developing a rule of federal common law on
the issue of welfare benefits. 7 The courts infer their authority from ERISA's
preemption provision, ERISA's legislative history,28 and the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act (LMRA)."
ERISA specifically "supersede[s] any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." 3 The Supreme
Court has stated that "Congress used the words 'relate to' in section [1144] in
their broad sense."3 The courts have reasoned that Congress intended the area
to be "an exclusive federal concern"32 and where statutory law is silent, the
federal courts should fashion a federal common law.33
"Music v. Western Conference of Teamsters, 712 F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1983).
2Reducing Retirees'Health Benefits: The Courts Develop a Remedy, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1399 (1985).
See Elser v. I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund, 684 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 813 (1983).
"Note, Employee Benefits Law: Securing Employee Welfare Benefits Through ERISA, 61 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 551, 567 (1986). See Adcock v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 616 F.Supp. 409, 421 (M.D. Tenn. 1985)
("Federal courts exend great deference to the administrator of a welfare benefit plan, and will not vacate an
administrator's decision unless such action is shown to be arbitrary and capricious, or made in bad faith.").
2629 U.S.C. § 1144 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
"788 F.2d at 1191 ("ERISA's broad preemption provision makes it clear that Congress intended to establish
employee benefit plan regulation as an exclusive federal concern, with federal law to apply exclusively, even
where ERISA itself furnishes no answer."). See also Adcock, 616 F.Supp. at 415; Musto, 615 F.Supp. at
1497.
nInfra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
"Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1975).
"29 U.S.C. § 11 44(a) (1982). See generally Hutchinson and Ifshin, Federal Pre-emption of State Law Under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 23 (1978).
"Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98 (1983). Both houses of Congress initially passed bills which
would have limited ERISA's preemption to the specific subjects covered under ERISA. The conference bill
which eventually passed was much broader: ERISA preempts all state laws "relating to" employee benefit
plans. Sherrick, ERISA Preemption: An Introduction, 64 MICH. BAR J. 1074 (1985). See also Alessi v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, 451 U.S. 504 (1981); Note, ERISA: Preemption of State Health Care Laws and
Worker Well-Being, 1981 U. OF ILL. L. REV. 825 (criticizing ERISA's broad preemption provisions as in-
terfering with states' attempts to legislate comprehensive health care).
"White Farm, 788 F.2d at 1191.
"One court has seen ERISA as a congressional mandate for a nationally uniform regulatory scheme. Men-
horn v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496, 1500 (9th Cir. 1984). The Menhorn court stated that
Congress realized that the bare terms... of these statutory provisions would not be sufficient to es-
Winter, 19871 COMMENT'S
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In support of their position the courts often cite the statement of Senator
Javits that "it is also intended that a body of federal substantive law will be
developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights under private
welfare and pension plans. '34 It has been suggested that "courts have used this
statement as carte blanche for developing a common law of welfare benefit
plans,"3 while largely ignoring the fact that ERISA's legislative history may
also support the contention that Congress did not intend that federal courts
develop a common law to fill in ERISA's gaps. 6 Nevertheless, it seems clear
that the courts are not overstepping their bounds by developing common law
rules to deal with the issue of whether certain retirees have a vested interest in
welfare benefit plans.
The same conclusion can be reached under the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act (LMRA) 7 Section 301 of the LMRA authorizes federal district court
jurisdiction over suits brought by and against labor organizations.38 This in-
cludes suits between employers and labor organizations as well as suits based
on contracts between employers and labor organizations.39 Although retirees
are no longer members of the collective bargaining unit,4° and active workers
are not required to negotiate on the behalf of retirees,4' they are not without
protection under the LMRA. The Supreme Court has noted that "under
established contract principles, vested retirement rights may not be altered
without the pensioner's consent ... the retiree, moreover, would have a federal
remedy under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act for breach
of contract if his rights were unilaterally changed." 2 The threshold question
tablish a comprehensive regulatory scheme. It accordingly empowered the courts to develop ... a
body of federal common law governing employee benefit plans. The federal common law serves three
related ends. First, it supplements the statutory scheme interstitially... Second and more generally, it
serves to ramify and develop the standards that the statute sets out in only general terms ... Third,
Congress viewed ERISA as a grant of authority to the courts to develop principles governing areas of
the law regulating employee benefit plans that had previously been the exclusive province of state
law.
Id. at 1498-1500. See also Terpinas v. Seafarer's Int'l Union, 722 F.2d 1445, 1447 (9th Cir. 1984); Musto,
615 F.Supp. at 1494; Adcock, 616 F.Supp. at 415; White Farm, 788 F.2d at 1191. Cf. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUN-
DA, J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 132 (2d ed. 1983) ("Federal courts have the power to create federal
common law when activities arise from and bear heavily upon a federal program, even though there is no
federal statute specifically applicable.").
120 Cong. Rec. 29, 942 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits), reprinted in 3 Legislative History of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 4771 (1976). See Adcock, 616 F. Supp. at 415; White Farm, 788
F.2d at 1191; Menhorn, 738 F.2d at 1499.
3'Note, Employee Benefits Law: Securing Employee Welfare Benefits Through ERISA, 61 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 551, 557 (1986).
3Id.
"Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1975).
3I Id. See generally Labor Policy and Labor Peace: A Survey 1979-1982 - Section 301 and the Enforcement
of Collective Bargaining Agreements in the Sixth Circuit, 13 U. TOL. L. REV. 763 (1982).
"Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 200 (1962).
"Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of Am. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 170 (1971).
"Id. at 173.
"Id. at 181 n. 20. See Turner v. Local Union No. 302, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 604 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir.
1979); Weimer v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 773 F.2d 669, 673 (6th Cir. 1985); Powell, 770 F.2d at 609. At least one
[Vol. 20:3
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remains as to whether the retirees' rights have vested.
A number of the welfare benefit cases have been brought under the
LMRA 3.4 The Supreme Court has held that federal substantive law is to be ap-
plied in LMRA actions." This federal substantive law must be based on the
underlying policy of the federal labor laws. 45 Traditional contract rules may be
applied as long as the application is consistent with federal labor policy."
Even in suits brought under ERISA, the courts may analogize to LMRA
actions to find that substantive federal law should apply. 7 Courts should
develop a federal common law applicable under both ERISA and the LMRA
in the interests of uniformity and consistency.
Under federal common law, state law is preempted 48 but not ignored.
State law may give courts guidance in developing a federal common law.49 The
Supreme Court, in the context of the LMRA, has stated that "Federal interpre-
tation of the federal law will govern, not state law. But state law, if compatible
with the purpose of [the LMRA], may be resorted to in order to find the rule
that will best effectuate the federal policy. Any state law applied, however, will
be absorbed as federal law and will not be a source of private rights."50
Under the LMRA and most of ERISA, federal and state courts have con-
current jurisdiction."1 Although most actions are brought in federal district
court, one federal court has noted that state courts are well-suited to decide
welfare benefit cases since such actions normally deal with application of
general principles of state contract law.52
court has noted that under the LMRA the union itself has standing to bring suit on behalf of retirees. Int'l
Union (UAW) v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1486 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984)
("As a signatory to the contract it could bring an action for the third party beneficiary retirees." In addition,
the active union employees, as future retirees, have an active interest in enforcing benefit plan provisions.).
"
3E.g., Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1476; Powell, 770 F.2d at 609; Weimer. 773 F.2d at 669; Local Union No.
150-A, United Food and Commercial Workers v. Dubuque Packing Co., 756 F.2d 66 (8th Cir. 1985); Dist.
17, Dist. 29, Local Union 7113, and Local Union 6023, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Allied Corp., 735
F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 3527 (1985); Int'l Union, (UAW) v. Roblin Indus., 561
F.Supp. 288 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
"Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).
45Id.
"Id. at 457.
"An ERISA Conference Committee Report noted that federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over claims of breach of fiduciary duty, but federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over other
ERISA claims. "All such actions in Federal or State courts are to be regarded as arising under the laws of the
United States in similar fashion to those brought under Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act
of 1947." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 120, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5177, 5188 (statement of Sen. Williams) (as quoted in Menhorn v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738
F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir. 1984).
"Supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
4gMusto. 615 F. Supp. at 1498; Terpinas. 722 F.2d at 1447. See generally Ray & Halpern, The Common
Law of ERISA: Federal Courts as Lawmakers, 21 TRIAL 20 (June 1985).
"Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457.
" d. at 456; infra note 57. See, e.g., Rutledge v. Dayton Malleable, Inc., 20 Ohio App.3d 229, 485 N.E.2d
757 (1984) (LMRA action brought in Ohio state court).
"Menhorn, 738 F.2d at 1500 n.2.
Winter, 19871 COMMENTS
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II. CASE LAW DEALING WITH VESTING OF
EMPLOYEES' RIGHTS TO WELFARE BENEFITS
The Sixth Circuit: Yard-Man and White Farm
To date, the Sixth Circuit has been the most active in developing rules in
this area. In 1983 the court decided the leading case of International Union
(UA W) v. Yard-Man, Inc." The case arose out of a collective bargaining agree-
ment entered into between the UAW and Yard-Man in 1974 which covered
the company's Jackson, Michigan, plant."' The plant closed in 1975. Two years
later the company notified retirees that their health and life insurance benefits
would terminate at the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement." In a
suit brought by the UAW, the court held that the health and welfare benefits
had vested in the retirees and were to continue beyond the life of the collective
bargaining agreement. 6
The court laid down the following approach to be used in determining
whether welfare rights under a collective bargaining agreement have vested:
The court should first look to the explicit language of the collective
bargaining agreement for clear manifestations of intent. The intended
meaning of even the most explicit language can, of course, only be
understood in light of the context which gave rise to its inclusion. The
court should also interpret each provision in question as part of the in-
tegrated whole. If possible, each provision should be construed consistent-
ly with the entire document and the relative positions and purposes of the
parties... The agreement's terms must be construed so as to render none
nugatory and avoid illusory promises ... Finally, the court should review
the interpretation ultimately derived from its examination of the
language, context and other indicia of intent for consistency with federal
labor policy57 (citations omitted).
The Yard-Man court also stated that "retiree benefits are in a sense
'status' benefits which, as such, carry with them an inference that they con-
tinue so long as the prerequisite status is maintained ... there is an inference
that the parties likely intended those benefits to continue as long as the
beneficiary remains a retiree."" The court went on to note that retiree welfare
benefits are not necessarily interminable and federal labor policy does not
53Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1476, cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984).
"Id. at 1478.
"Id. The agreement was to expire June 1, 1977.
%Id. at 1481.
"Id. at 1479-80. The collective bargaining agreement in Yard-Man stated that when the retiree has turned
65, "the Company will provide insurance benefits equal to the active group benefits . . . for the former
employee and his spouse." Id. at 1480. The court found this language to be ambiguous. Turning then to the
language in other parts of the agreement and the context under which the provision arose, the court held
that the intent was to give retirees a vested right in the benefits. Id at 1481-83.
"Id. at 1482.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:3
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presumptively favor vesting of welfare rights when the collective bargaining
agreement is silent on the issue. 9 The court found that the nature of the
benefits in the context of the collective bargaining process provided an in-
ference that the parties intended the rights to vest.6° However, the court cau-
tioned that this factor alone was insufficient to establish intent; the controlling
factor was the language of the agreement itself.6'
The Sixth Circuit has recently addressed the issue of vesting of welfare
benefit rights in a non-union context. In In re White Farm Equipment Co.,
61
White Farm had filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the federal
Bankruptcy Code.63 A related company entered an agreement to assume the
obligations to White Farm retirees under the non-contributory welfare benefit
plan." A short time later retirees were notified that the welfare benefit plan
would be discontinued; identical coverage would be available on a fully con-
tributory basis at group rates.65
Retirees and spouses of deceased retirees filed for adversary proceedings
in the bankruptcy court." Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit court, on appeal from
the bankruptcy court and federal district court, held that retiree welfare
benefits do not automatically vest at retirement.67 The parties' intent is deter-
minative as to whether the employer retains the right to modify or terminate
the plan.68 In this particular case, the documentary evidence was found to be
ambiguous and the case was remanded for findings as to the parties' intent.
69
The court agreed with the statement in Yard-Man that the first item the
591d.
601d.
11d. This discussion of the "status" nature of retiree benefits has been cited in several cases. Almost all of the
cases that cite this passage are in the Sixth Circuit, e.g., Weimer v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 773 F.2d 669, 673 (6th
Cir. 1985); Policy v. Powell Pressed Steel Co., 770 F.2d 609, 616 (6th Cir. 1985); Int'l Union and Local 784,
UAW v. Cadillac Malleable Iron Co., 728 F.2d 807, 809 (6th Cir. 1984); Eardman v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.
Employee Welfare Benefit Plans, 607 F.Supp. 196 (D.C. N.Y. 1984).







6"Id. The documentary evidence consisted of three summary booklets issued by the company to its
employees. Some of the pertinent language in the booklets, which the appellate court found to be am-
biguous, included the following:
Your insurance terminates when you leave our employ, when you are no longer eligible or when the
group policy terminates, whichever happens first ....
If your Group Life Insurance terminates because the Group policy is terminated or amended...
you may also make application to convert your Group Life insurance to an individual Life insurance
policy ....
The company fully intends to continue your plans indefinitely. However, the Company does
reserve the right to change the plans, and, if necessary, discontinue them. (Emphasis added)
Id. at 1188-89. It could be argued that the finding of the bankruptcy court, that this language unambiguous-
ly established the employer's right to modify or terminate the plan, was correct.
Winter, i19871 COMMENTS
7
Figetakis: Retiree Welfare Benefits
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1987
AKRON LAW REVIEW
court must look to in deciding whether employees have a vested interest in
welfare benefit rights is the contract itself.70 Secondly, the court must "look to
federal law to see if any express or implied statutory command or other federal
policy mandates a federal common law rule limiting the right of an employer
to exercise . . . a reserved right of termination."'" The court found that no
federal statute requires mandatory vesting: ERISA exempts welfare benefits
from mandatory vesting.72 In addition, the court found that there was no clear
precedent under state or federal case law on which to base a federal common
law rule of mandatory vesting." The court also noted that mandatory vesting
of retiree welfare benefits is a matter for the legislature rather than the courts.7 '
In examining the Sixth Circuit view of Yard-Man and White Farm,
several rules become apparent. The first is that the governing factor as to
vesting of retiree welfare benefits will be the intent of the parties.75 In determin-
ing intent, the courts must first look to the language expressed in the collective
bargaining agreement76  or other relevant documents, such as plan
descriptions.77 Since the courts may liberally construe ambiguities, 8 employers
wishing to retain modification and/or termination rights must clearly reserve
those rights. Employers must also guard against contradictory language in
other parts of the writing.79 Additionally, the court may ultimately look to fac-
tors outside the writings as relevant in determining the parties' intent. 0
Secondly, the court will not support a judicially created common law rule
71d. at 1191.
711d.
71Id. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
11Id. at 1192-93. The district court had ruled that welfare benefit rights automatically vest at retirement. Id.
at 1192. The appellate court pointed out that the state law cases the lower court had relied on were pre-
ERISA and, with one exception, dealt with pension rather than welfare rights. Id.
One case cited by the lower court did deal with welfare benefits: Sheehy v. Seilon, Inc., 10 Ohio St.2d 242,
227 N.E.2d 229 (1967). In Sheehy the Supreme Court of Ohio held that employees who had been induced to
continue employment with the company by promises of life and health insurance coverage had a vested
right to these benefits upon retirement, notwithstanding a provision in the contract to the contrary. Id. In
White Farm the appellate court stated that Sheehy "arose prior to ERISA's effectiveness, however, and we
are not bound to follow the Ohio law construed there." White Farm, 788 F.2d at 1192.
"White Farm, 788 F.2d at 1192.
"Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1479-80; White Farm, 788 F.2d at 1186.
"Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1479.
"White Farm, 788 F.2d at 1191.
"See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
"Contradictory terms may make the parties' intent ambiguous; additionally, "the collective bargaining
agreement's terms must be construed so as to render none nugatory and avoid illusory promises." Yard-
Man, 716 F.2d at 1480. See also Van Olson, supra note 1, at 406.
1' Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1480. See also Int'l Union and Local 784, UAW v. Cadillac Malleable Iron Co.,
728 F.2d 807, 808 (6th Cir. 1984) (court found fact that retiree welfare benefits were paid by the company
when no collective bargaining agreement was in effect - during a strike - indicative of the company's in-
tent that the benefits were not tied to the duration of the collective bargaining agreement); Eardman v. Beth-
lehem Steel Corp. Employee Welfare Benefit Plans, 607 F.Supp. 196 (D.C. N.Y. 1984) (court found a decid-
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that retiree welfare benefits vest at retirement. The White Farm court very ex-
plicitly overruled a lower court decision that had espoused such an automatic
vesting rule."
Finally, the White Farm opinion indicates that the language of Yard-Man
concerning the "status" nature of retiree benefits should not be given too much
weight. Several writers have commented on Yard-Man's language and con-
cluded that the Sixth Circuit espouses an alternate view to the contract theory
of other courts.82 The lower court decision in White Farm bolstered these
writers' views. 3
Interestingly, although White Farm quotes other language from Yard-
Man,"4 it does not refer to Yard-Man's analysis of the status nature of retiree
benefits. Apparently the status nature of retiree benefits is confined to the col-
lective bargaining context. 5 The court was willing then to give plaintiffs the
benefit of "an inference that the parties likely intended those benefits to con-
tinue as long as the beneficiary remains a retiree."
In a later case 7 the Sixth Circuit court stated that "normally retiree bene-
fits are vested ... because retirees, with respect to their benefits, are unprotect-
ed in the collective bargaining process. Upon expiration of a collective bargain-
ing agreement, a union owes no duty to bargain for continued non-vested ben-
efits for retirees." 8 This suggests the policy behind the inference given to sup-
port plaintiff retirees' position: the desire to protect retirees who can no longer
protect themselves in the collective bargaining process. As retirees in a non-
union setting are equally at a bargaining disadvantage, logically there should
be no distinction between the two situations. If union retirees are entitled to
the inference that their rights are vested, then plaintiffs in a non-union setting,
such as those in White Farm, are equally entitled to this inference.
As stated in Yard-Man, the inference that retiree rights are vested is not
alone sufficient to establish the intent of the parties.8 9 This inference does not
"I White Farm, 788 F.2d at 1193 ("We have decided that the district court's ruling, under which the existence
and scope of a termination clause in this type of case would be immaterial, is erroneous ...
"
2Note, Employee Benefits Law: Securing Employee Welfare Benefits Through ERISA, 61 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 551,561-63 (1986); Shultz & Langan, Current Developments in Employee Benefits, 10 EMPLOYEE REL.
L.J. 732 (1985); Van Olson, supra note 1, at 405; Reducing Retirees'Health Benefits: The Courts Develop a
Remedy, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1399, 1400-01 (1985) (author found the fact that welfare benefits had
been referred to as "deferred compensation" and "status benefits" came "very close to suggesting that health
benefits are vested entitlements.').
3Supra note 82.
"White Farm, 788 F.2d at 1192.
"See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482.
"Id.
PWeimer v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 773 F.2d 669 (6th Cir. 1985).
aId. at 672. See also Policy v. Powell Pressed Steel Co., 770 F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1985). Both Weimer and
Policy cite Yard-Man for the proposition that retiree benefit rights are normally vested, although Yard-Man
does not explicitly state this. See Weimer 773 F.2d at 672; Policy, 770 F.2d at 612-13.
11Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482.
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rise to the level of a presumption. In International Union and Local 784, UA W
v. Cadillac Malleable Iron Co.,90 the court stated that "there is no legal
presumption based on the status of employees.'91
Cadillac Malleable cited the status language of Yard-Man" and noted
that the lower court had considered the history of collective bargaining be-
tween the union and the company and found that the intent of the parties was
that the welfare benefits be paid for life to the retirees.93 One persuasive fact
noted by the court was that the company had paid premiums for life and
health insurance of retirees during a strike, when no collective bargaining
agreement was in effect.94
A federal district court in Tennessee has also considered welfare benefits
of retirees. In Musto v. American General Corp.," the court focused on the
fact that the company's welfare benefit plan was "a major inducement to at-
tract employees. The promise of continued benefits at no cost to the individual
after retirement was a material part of the presention to prospective
employees." 96 The court found the company's plan to be at least partly respon-
sible "for retaining a productive and reliable work force." 97
At the same time the company was promising retirement benefits at no
cost to employees, in important documents the company was reserving the
right, if necessary, to terminate or modify those benefits. 98 Eventually the com-
pany unilaterally modified the plan to require contributions from retirees for
continued coverage99 and plaintiffs brought a class action.
In examining the evidence, the court found that there was conflicting lan-
guage in the welfare plan descriptions." Following the precept that terms
must be construed to avoid nugatory and illusory promises, the court went on




"Id. A Ninth Circuit case also found the fact that the employer made payments during a strike to be per-
suasive evidence that the parties intended that the rights were to outlast the collective bargaining agreement.
Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 725 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1984).




"Id. at 1491. One reason for the company's action was the fact that the cost of the medical plan had in-
creased four-fold in five years. Id. at 1496.
"'Id. at 1499. The court stated that
the termination/modification clause contained in the NLTINLA summary plan descriptions clearly
and expressly reserve the right to amend and terminate the medical insurance benefit plan. At the
same time, however, the plan descriptions also promise to continue the plans after the plaintiffs'
retire, without further cost to the retiree. The Court cannot read both provisions together without
reaching the conclusion that the provisions conflict and require interpretation of what the parties
mutually intended by placing the terms in the agreement.
[Vol. 20:3
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to consider the fact that the parties no longer had equal bargaining power.'0'
The retirees had performed their part of the agreement by giving the company
years of service; the court reasoned that these retirees were now entitled to the
benefits that they had bargained for. 02 The insurance coverage in this case was
characterized "as a non-monetary form of past employment, deferred
income."' 03
Additionally, the court noted that any modification, according to the re-
serve clause, must be "necessary."'" The court then laid down a stringent test
for when a modification or termination is necessary: the company must show
not that the costs of the medical insurance plan far outweigh the in-
surance premiums paid by retirees, but rather that the contractual prom-
ises previously made are now avaoidable because of some unforeseen con-
tingency that threatens the financial base of the entire corporation. 05
The general tenor of these cases is that retirees have a right to welfare
benefits that they had bargained for and relied on. As seen, however, the com-
mon law as developed by the courts looks first to the intent of the parties to see
whether the retirees' rights have vested."'1 Clearly, courts may not fashion a
federal common law rule that welfare benefits mandatorily vest at
retirement. 07
Other Circuits
Very few cases dealing directly with this issue have been reported from




"'Id at 1495. Note that pension rights, which vest under ERISA requirements, are normally characterized
as deferred income. Id.
10'1d. at 1500.
'0Id. Compare Int'l Union, UAW v. Roblin Industries, 561 F.Supp. 288 (W.D. Mich. 1983), where the court
looked at the fact that insurance rates for the company were based on a group consisting of both active and
retired workers. The court stated that if the group were limited to retirees, insurance would be almost unob-
tainable because of the prohibitively high rates. Id. at 299. The court viewed this "as evidence that retiree
benefits were not intended to extend beyond the duration of collective bargaining agreements." Id.
"Supra notes 57-101 and accompanying text. Compare these views with the ones expressed in Int'l Union,
UAW v. Roblin Industries, 561 F.Supp. 288 (W.D. Mich. 1983). In Roblin. the court found the parties'
agreement to be ambiguous; in looking to parol evidence, the court held that the parties did not intend the
welfare benefits to be guaranteed for life. Id at 293. The court stated that collective bargaining agreements
do not usually create or guarantee the continuance of an employer-employee relationship. Id. at 298. As a
result, "the rights conferred under a collective bargaining agreement do not normally survive the discontin-
uance of a business or the expiration of a bargaining agreement." Id.
The court went on to note that if the parties intended that the welfare benefits were to continue after the
plant closed, "the agreement must so provide." Id. Contrast this with the holding in Rutledge v. Dayton
Malleable, Inc., 20 Ohio App.3d 229, 485 N.E.2d 757 (1984) that retirees' rights to employer-funded in-
surance were vested in the absence of limiting language to the contrary.
""'Id. Even if a substantial body of state case law existed on which to predicate a vesting rule, in light of the
fact that ERISA excludes welfare plans from its vesting requirements, the federal courts probably still would
be hesitant about requiring that welfare fights mandatorily vest.
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case law in this area.
To date, the major Fourth Circuit decision has been District 17, District
29, Local Union 7113, and Local Union 6023, United Mine Workers ofAmeri-
ca v. Allied Corp.'10 In Allied, the court found that the clear language of the
agreement required payment of health benefits only during the term of the
agreement."
The company continued to pay benefits for sixteen months beyond the ex-
piration of the agreement."0 The court held that the company was not estopped
from discontinuing benefits, as any reliance was not reasonable in light of the
employees' knowledge of the agreement.' The court noted that while pension
rights are normally vested, "health and welfare benefits are negotiated
periodically and last only the life of the collective bargaining agreement.""'
This language was derived from the Ninth Circuit case of Turner v. Local
Union No. 302, International Brotherhood of Teamsters."3 In Turner, the cur-
rent employees of the company, through their union, ratified a collective
bargaining agreement that provided for a decrease in the benefits of a health
and welfare trust."' Retirees brought suit. The court found that the language
of the relevant agreements allowed modification of the level of welfare benefits
retirees were to receive."5
More recently, in Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 6 the Ninth Circuit reversed
10735 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 3527 (1985).
"'Id. at 124. The agreement provided that
[E]ach signatory Employer shall establish an Employee benefit plan to provide, implemented through
an insurance carrier(s), health and other non-pension benefits for its Employees covered by this
Agreement as well as pensioners under the 1974 Pension Plan and Trust, whose last classified
employment was with such Employer. The benefits provided pursuant to such plans shall be
guaranteed during the time of this Agreement by each Employer at levels set forth in such plans. (Em-
phasis added)
Id. at 124 n. 6. Testimony showed that all benefits were open for negotiation every three years. Id. at 127.
"1d at 129.
1"Id. at 130.
11id. at 129 (citing Turner v. Local Union No. 302, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 604 F.2d 1219 (9'h Cir. 1979)).
"'604 F.2d at 1225.
"'Id at 1222. The desired decrease in the benefit plan was caused by financial concern: fewer active
employees and more retired employees had resulted in contributions that were insufficient to meet current
expenditures for retirees' benefits. Id. at 1223.
"'Id. at 1224-25. Ten trustees, five selected by the union and five picked by the companies, administered the
health and welfare benefit trust fund. The Trust Agreement provided that these trustees could "increase the
benefits available under any of the programs ... if in Itheir] judgment there are sufficient sums in the Fund"
and could "decrease benefits under any of the programs ... if in [their] judgment such action is warranted."
Id. at 1222.
The court also noted that
The record of the successive collective bargaining agreements shows that appellant's rights to the
health and welfare benefits were not vested. They could be terminated t tie end of any one of the
collective bargaining agreements. None of the documents establishing 1 ,e alth and welfare benefits
made any representation as to the length of the period during which these benefits would continue to
be paid, other than "throughout the term of this agreement."
Id. at 1225.
"'725 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1984). 12
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a lower court that had rendered summary judgment for the defendant com-
pany and remanded the case for further findings. In Bower, retirees alleged
that the company improperly terminated retirement medical insurance when
the company ceased operations."' The appellate court found that agreements
between the company and employees were ambiguous as to the expiration of
retiree medical insurance."' Language in the plan description suggested that
retiree insurance benefits were not limited to the duration of the collective
bargaining agreement." 9 The court further noted that there was a factual issue
as to whether management had represented the benefits as lifelong to the
employees."2 The fact that the company had continued payments for retiree
benefits during a strike was an objective manifestation of the company's intent
and probably indicated that the retiree benefits were not tied to the duration of
the collective bargaining agreement.'
The Ninth Circuit is evidently not going to adopt the Sixth Circuit's
reasoning that retirees in a collective bargaining context are entitled to an in-
ference that retiree benefits are vested at retirement., Although the Bower
opinion cited Yard-Man, it did so only superficially. Bower focused on the
language of the agreement.'"
Too few cases exist on this point to firmly indicate the Ninth Circuit's
opinion. However, the findings of the court in Bower indicate that the courts
may be moving away from the dogmatic statement in Turner that "health and
welfare benefits are negotiated periodically and are paid from a fund of em-
ployer contributions and last only the life of the collective bargaining agree-
ment." 2 4
The Eighth Circuit considered this issue in Local Union No. 150-A,
United Food and Commercial Workers v. Dubuque Packing Co. 5 The com-
pany, after a plant closing, notified retirees that their health and welfare
benefits would terminate when the collective bargaining agreement expired. 2 6
The court found the contract to be ambiguous and admitted parol






"'See supra notes 58-60, 82-91 and accompanying text.
"'Bower, 725 F.2d at 1223.
'' Turner, 604 F.2d at 1225.
"2756 F.2d 66 (8th Cir. 1985).
"Id. at 67.
'1d at 69. The lower court had found that employees were told they would receive lifetime benefits; the
company continued benefits when no collective bargaining agreement was in effect; and the company con-
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receive welfare benefits arises from the retirees' status as a past employee, the
court stated that "the dispute is simply one of contract interpretation."'2 In
this case, the court felt that plaintiff retirees had carried their burden of proof
to show that the rights were vested. 29
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
In many of these cases, the courts examined the policy concerns behind
the situation. Federal labor policy is relevant in developing a federal common
law. 30 One concern of federal labor statutes and policy is the bargaining power
between parties in a collective bargaining situation. It is asserted in Yard-Man
that the underlying concept of federal labor law "is an attempt to place the em-
ployer and its employees in relatively equal positions of bargaining strength."'3'
The union has used its collective strength to obtain retiree benefits. It is there-
fore unfair of the employer to subsequently "attempt to regain from the in-
dividual retirees what it gave up in the collective bargaining process."132
Other courts have been similarly concerned with the lack of bargaining
power by retirees. In one LMRA case the court observed that
Irletired employees have no economic or bargaining power within this
system. Their financial security derives from past economic power
pragmatically and prudently exercised. Once retirement benefits have
been bargained for, earned, and become payable, the employer may not
recant on his contractual obligation to pay them... Nor may retirees de-
mand that they be increased. Changing economic facts pertaining to the
employer's business or the general economy occurring after an employee
retires cannot enhance or depreciate the value of his prior services or
justify periodic post-retirement negotiations.1
In Musto v. American General Corp., '3 the court stated that employers should
not have unilateral discretion in modifying or terminating welfare benefit
plans since retirees have already given years of service to the company and are
no longer in a position to bargain with the company.' 35 Thus "to permit the en-
forcement of termination/modification clauses without a showing of good
cause has the effect of reducing the status of hard earned welfare plan benefits
'aid. at 70.
291d.
"'See supra notes 50, 71-72 and accompanying text.
" Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1496.
1321d.
"'Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Chemical Div. v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 936,946-47 (6th Cir. 1970), affdsub nom.
Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
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to mere gratuities."'36 Similarly, in Weimer v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc.,' the court
stated that because retirees are usually unprotected in the collective bargaining
process, retiree benefit rights are normally vested. 3
Another source of federal labor policy is ERISA and its legislative history.
The broad intent of ERISA is to protect employee benefit plans,'39 including
safeguarding retirement income from "unforeseeable, arbitrary and capricious
reductions or modification by former employers and others."'"
The vesting provisions of ERISAI'4 were Congress' response to numerous
problems concerning pensions.'42 These problems included misadministration
of funds; employees' loss of entire pensions if they left their jobs, voluntarily or
otherwise, before retirement; and loss of pensions due to the insolvency of the
employer.' Congress omitted welfare benefit plans from the vesting re-
quirements of ERISA because of a concern over the cost of the pension plans
and ease of administration.'" ERISA was "a finely tuned balance between pro-
tecting pension benefits for employees while limiting the cost to employers."'45
Another consideration is that vesting of welfare benefits, either under
statute or federal common law, would have a chilling effect on employers' will-
ingness to offer such plans. In response to this concern, one court noted that if
an employer offers such benefits, the "employer must take a more realistic ap-
proach to the promises he makes in seeking to solicit and retain quality
employees and not to promise more than he is willing to pay.' '
In fairness, employees should be able to rely on the promises of
employers. The question remains as to whether employers should be required
to promise that a certain amount of welfare benefits will vest upon retirement.
At least one court has considered the public interest in providing and protect-
"'Id. at 1497.
137773 F.2d 669 (6th Cir. 1985).
"'Id at 672.
"'See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).
"'Musto, 615 F. Supp. at 1494.
141See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
"'See Adcock v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 616 F.Supp. 409, 414 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
143Id.
'"Id.
1'1Id. at 414 (quoting ATO, Inc. v. Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp., 634 F.2d 1013, 1021 (6th Cir. 1980)).
Adcock also cited the Senate Finance Committee Report which stated that
[tlo require the vesting of these ancillary benefits would seriously complicate the administration and
increase the cost of plans whose primary function is to provide retirement income. Also, where the
employee moves from one employer to another, the ancillary benefits (which are usually on a con-
tingency basis) would often be provided by the new employer, whereas the new employer normally
would not provide pension benefits based on service with the old employer.
Adcock, 616 F.Supp. at 414-15 n. 3. See Note, Employer Benefits Law: Securing Employee Welfare Benefits
Through ERISA, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 551, 570-71 (1986) (suggesting that Congress balance the above
concerns and promulgate vesting schedules for welfare benefits, as it did for pension benefits).
"'Musto. 615 F.Supp. at 1500-01.
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ing health and welfare benefits of the elderly. 47 The court noted that as be-
tween the general public and the employer, the employer should have to honor
its promises to retirees and finance the insurance plan, so that "individuals can
rely on private support during their retirement years and ... will not have to
rely on public subsidy."1 48
The fact remains that the legislature has not required mandatory vesting
of welfare benefits, and the legislature is the proper authority to do so. The
courts remain unwilling and unable to fashion a common law mandatory
vesting rule.' 9 Unless the legislature addresses this issue, the governing factor
as to whether welfare rights have vested is the parties' intent, as evidenced by
their written agreements and conduct.
FRANCES FIGETAKIS
"Id. at 1505.
'"Id. Note that this suggests the court is concerned with the overall resources of the country. Cf Machan,
Some Philosophical Aspects of National Labor Policy, 4 HARv. J. LAW & PUB. POLICY 67 (1981) (suggesting
that the philosophical trend of American labor policy today has a paramount concern with evenly
distributing wealth regardless of merit or individual choice).
"'Courts may develop federal common law, but where Congress "has expressly announced its intention to
occupy the field, federal courts will not lightly create additional rights under the rubric of federal common
law." Amato, 773 F.2d at 1419 (quoting from Van Ormon v. Am. Insurance Co., 680 F.2d 306, 312 (3d Cir.
1982)). See also note 81 and accompanying text.
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